

# **Corruption and Political Institutions in Portugal: An Exploratory Analysis**

First Draft of Ongoing Analysis

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## **Abstract**

Corruption, political cover-ups, and fraud in a general form have become a matter of political debate in the last few years in Portugal. It is not that corrupt politicians and government officials were not around before the 21<sup>st</sup> century and are only now abusing their public authority, but is it only now coming out in public and in a big way. After thirty years of democracy, Portuguese public misuse of power is apparently no longer tolerated for government officials suspected of fraud and corruption now are being formally charged. The literature on corruption and democracy indicate that this is a positive sign of progress in the democratic development of sound political institutions. Empirical studies are few and recent, but they generally tend to point to a negative effect of corruption on attitudes toward government. In Portugal, however, despite public knowledge of alleged events, citizens do not seem to assign any blame. In fact, perceptions of corruption and fraud do not always seem to affect citizens' propensity to trust in political institutions. Using surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer in Portugal, we explore the relationship between corruption and fraud and political trust in different political institutions. We find that this relationship varies depending upon the institution. Citizens with a greater perception and concern for corruption and fraud in general express lower levels of trust in government and in the justice system. Results also show that this relationship does not hold in the case of the parliament, political parties, and the police.

In June of 2001, the Portuguese police forces took a severe blow. Almost 200 hundred police officers are being tried for dishonoring the profession and accepting money or other goods in exchange for handing out fines and for turning the way so as to avoid arresting anyone for unlawful acts. The scheme, first uncovered in involves hundreds of enterprises doing business with many police officers. Sworn testimony affirms that this is just a glimpse of what goes on and that accepting bribes is general practice among all ranks of the police force.

This police scandal was among the first of a series of messy corruption situations that would come out in the open. The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century witnessed what seems to be a relentless pursuit of “under the table” deals that have been financing dirty politicians and government officials. Suspicions of the existence of such scams have always been around, but until recently no one would officially ever mention them. It was not something one would or could do. Rather, one would just complain it about behind closed doors.

Not so any, though. The media has helped shed light on many similar stories involving many of national political institutions. The public is showered with stories on past corruption activities hidden in the closets of many politicians. Local government has taken the worst beating of all. Of the 308 municipal governments, the presidents of the executive council, in at least three, are involved or being tried for corruption. More cases are likely to be uncovered.

What is curious about all of this is that the suspicion and accusations of corrupt activity do not seem to have an effect on the public’s attitudes towards government and other political institutions. One of the stories most often covered by the media is that of Fátima Felgueiras, president of the municipality that by mere coincidence is also named Felgueiras. She was charged with grossly mishandling the municipality’s public funds to her benefit. Having been tipped of a warrant for her arrest, she fled the country to Brasil to avoid prison time while awaiting trial that is scheduled to begin in the Fall of 2005. She has often addressed the Portuguese citizens on her own behalf and seems to have succeeded in getting through to the

residents in Felgueiras given that there is an organized group interceding for her in the municipality. She actually plans to run for office in the upcoming municipal elections later this year. What is more, she plans to win. And you know? She might just pull it off.

There appears to be a lack of any connection between political corruption and citizens' attitudes towards the political institutions involved. What explains the public response (or apparent lack of) to these corruption scandals? Why are we failing to see a negative reflection of these scandals on the level of trust in political institutions? People do not seem to be blaming the institutions. The literature on corruption and democracy indicate that this is a positive sign of progress in the democratic development of sound political institutions. If, on the one hand, the mechanisms that allow for the formal accusation of corrupt activities can be interpreted as a sign of the development of democratic political institutions (Rose-Ackerman 1999; 2001), how can we interpret, on the other hand, the fact that are citizens not assigning responsibility for these activities? The so-called "responsibility hypothesis" (Anderson 1995; Nannestad and Paldam 1993; Paldam and Schneider 1980) does not seem to apply here. What are the potential effects of this on the development of these institutions?

In this study, we take a first look at the relationship between corruption and political trust in Portugal and gain insight on whether and how perceptions of corruption and fraud affect citizens' attitudes towards democratic institutions. According to inferences made by economic empiricists (Lambsdorff 2003; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002; Feld and Frey 2002; Treisman 2000; Mauro 1995), countries that lacking in economic development indicators are more likely to experience corrupt and fraudulent activities. This being the case, since Portugal always lags behind considerably when comparing its economic performance to average EU performance, Portugal is a likely haven for corruption. A recent finance study conducted by the World Bank revealed that on a corruption perception scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes the belief in the inexistence of corruption, and 10 the belief in total or widespread corruption,

Portuguese businessmen and analysts scored 6.3 (Kaufmann 2004).

We begin by covering the brief literature on corruption as it pertains to attitudes toward political institutions. We then turn to issues of data and measurement. Using surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer in Portugal, we explore the relationship between corruption and fraud and political trust in different political institutions. Following this, we discuss the findings. Logit results indicate that the existence of this relationship varies depending upon the institution. We find that citizens with a greater perception and concern for corruption and fraud in general express lower levels of trust in government. Results also show that this relationship does not hold for trust in the parliament, political parties, the justice system and the police. Different specific types of corruption and fraud show some effect on political trust in the parliament, political parties, and the justice, but not effect at all on trust levels in the police.

### **Explaining Political Trust**

Political trust is a central pillar of democratic theory, and for the past 40 years it has occupied the minds of many political scientists devoted to the study of democratic governance. Trust in political institutions influences how people view the government and, ultimately, how they behave. It is a critical element to popular control of policy and support for the democratic regime because it establishes a connection between citizens of a democracy and the institutions that represent them. As a “valued commodity in democratic polities” (Marsh 1971), confidence in the ruling political institutions helps determine individual attachment to the political framework and the workings of the existing political system. Disenchantment, distrust, and cynicism—in a word dissatisfaction—contribute to political alienation and undermine the very essence of democracy (Lipset 1959; Citrin 1974; Powell 1986; Lockerbie 1993).

“Popular confidence in democratic institutions is at the heart of representative government. Widespread confidence reduces the potential for radical change to the

system, but it also encourages a constructive desire for social reform.” (McAllister 1999: 202)

When people trust in the regime and its institutions, they are more likely to participate in politics so as to improve their lives in society (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1989; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Lambert et al. 1986; Putnam 1993). General satisfaction with institutional arrangements increases both diffuse and specific support for these institutions (Easton 1965). This increases their legitimacy and stability in the long run (Easton and Dennis 1969). “Democratic institutions are believed vulnerable to breakdown in times crisis unless rooted in shared norms of political trust, tolerance, respect for human rights, willingness to compromise, moderation, and belief in democratic legitimacy.” (Norris 1999: 264). In sum, persistent well- (or ill-) functioning institutions affect the extent to which citizens trust (or distrust) politically.

### **Corruption and Political Trust**

Despite the relevance of political trust to scholars of political behavior, it has been mostly studied in light of the effects that economic performance evaluations can have on it. Rarely have scientists examined the effect of political performance indicators. Corruption and fraud are examples of such an indicator. This is because corruption and fraud have been documented in the literature to weaken the proper functioning and maintenance of political institutions (Rose-Ackerman 2001; 1999; Treisman 2000). It is plausible to argue, as has been done mostly by economists, that corruption, as well as the perception of corruption, produces debilitating effects on people’s attitudes towards political institutions. Empirical studies are few and recent, and they generally tend to point to a negative effect of corruption on attitudes toward government. Despite this, few political science studies have fully and systematically explored how corruption affects people’s trust in democratic institutions and how this in turn affects the credibility of these institutions (see for exceptions, Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Rose,

Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; and Mishler and Rose 2001).

### **Data and Research Design**

Our research design is very straightforward; to test the corruption-trust hypothesis in Portugal, we need data that at the very least capture both citizens' perceptions of corruption and their tendency to trust in institutions. This paper is part of project funded by the Portuguese government that aims to establish a periodic survey on political attitudes and behavior. For the time being, we must rely on international data sources, and to date, only the Eurobarometer conducts surveys in Portugal. We use 2003 data from the most recent survey, Eurobarometer 60.1, containing both corruption and political support/trust items. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics on all variables.

(Table 1 about here)

The model employed is a logit model of the trust in political institutions,

$$\ln \left\{ \frac{Trust}{1 - Trust} \right\} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Corruption + \beta_2 Political\ Interest + \beta_3 LR + \beta_4 EgoEcon + \beta_5 SocioEcon + \beta_6 LifeSat + \beta_7 Age + \beta_8 Gender + \beta_9 EmploymentStatus + \beta_{10} MaritalStatus + \mu .$$

### **Dependent Variable: Political Trust**

Our dependent variable is a measure of political trust. Respondents were asked about their trust levels in several political institutions (for question wording and coding procedures, see Appendix). These institutions include the national government, the national parliament, political parties, the justice system, and the police. Essentially, we run five sets of models, one for each institution.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of trust levels in Portugal since the 1990s. It displays the mean levels of political trust in government and trust in parliament, reported at three different moments in time in the last ten years for the institutions under examination in this study. Examining the means for both trust in the national government and in the national parliament, people's predispositions to trust appear to be declining throughout the decade. In 1993, average trust in government was little over .7; in 1997, the typical trust level had dropped to about .55 and drifted to about .53 in 2001. In 2003, we see a clear drop in average trust to about .38. This fall comes as no surprise, as the literature on political trust points to a general decline in trust levels.

(Figure 1 about here)

### **Independent Variables**

Since our primary interest is in the relationship between attitudes of trust and perceptions of corruption and fraud, our principal independent variable is the perception of corruption and fraud. To capture these perceptions, we rely on two sets of questions dealing with corruption and fraud. One set of items asks about citizens' level knowledge of the existence of corruption and fraud. Respondents were provided a list of several corrupt and fraudulent activities and were asked to choose those of which they were aware. The other question inquires about citizens' preoccupation with these issues. Again, respondents were asked to choose from a list of items pertaining to corrupt and fraudulent activities those that worried them the most. Of these lists of items from which to choose, we selected the activities most related to governmental corruption and fraud (see Appendix for more details). We then recoded these options as separate, alternate dummy variables measuring perception of corruption and fraud. We end up with two variables measuring awareness: one dealing with fraud generally



(*awareness of fraud*) and the other dealing with tax evasion (*awareness of tax evasion*). We also end up with three variables measuring preoccupation with corruption and fraud: two dealing with fraud and corruption in general, respectively (*concern fraud* and *concern corruption*), and a third dealing with a specific concern for corrupt and fraud in national and local government (*concern gov. wrongdoings*). If the respondent chose these items, we scored that individual as 1; if not we scored him/her as 0.

Also in regard to our main independent variable, we opted to use more aggregate measures of these corruption variables. Two composite corruption indexes were constructed, one in regard to the knowledge of corruption and fraud and the other in regard to concern with these issues. These indexes were constructed by summing the scores of the respective items selected by the respondents. Higher scores mean greater awareness and concern for corruption and fraud. Based on the awareness of corruption questions, the corruption awareness index is the sum of the corruption items that the respondent is aware of. If the respondent selected both fraud and tax evasion the index is scored a 2; if either fraud or tax evasion were selected the index is scored 1; and, finally, if neither items was selected the index is scored 0. The corruption concern index follows the same logic. If the respondent selected all three items, the index is scored a 3; if two of the three items were selected, the index is scored a 2; if only one of the three factors was selected, the index is coded 1; and finally, if none of the items is selected, the index is scored 0.

The scale has a mean of 2.35 and a standard deviation of 2.7; it ranges from 0 to 10 at the individual level, with higher values indicating a higher propensity to protest.

Along with our main independent variables of interest, we also included a number of important control variables that were available in the survey. In our attempt to ensure the best possible specification of the multivariate model, we also controlled for a number of important individual-level predictors of political involvement, ideology, life satisfaction, prospective

economic evaluations (both egocentric and sociotropic), and demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital as well as employment situation (details can be found in the Appendix)<sup>1</sup>.

## **Analysis and Results**

Do perceptions of corruption and fraud have a negative effect on Portuguese tendency to trust? The short answer is yes. Table 2 shows the results of several specifications of our base model in regard to the political institution of government. Given its role in the political system and in the literature on political support, it is the primary institution of interest when studying the attitudinal effects. Therefore, we first turn to political trust in government. In Table 2, we estimate four different model specifications of the base model presented above. The variation in specification has to do with the different measures of corruption and fraud; all models contain the same control variables. Model 1 uses both the worry and awareness of corruption and fraud variables. Models 2 and 3 employ these indexes alternatively. The last column, Model 4, shows the results when only the individual measures of worry and awareness of corruption and fraud are included simultaneously.

The results of these analyses clearly show evidence to support the corruption/trust hypothesis. Models 1 through 3 provide evidence that greater awareness of corrupt and fraudulent activities in or against the government has a negative effect on citizens' propensity to trust in government. The effect is even greater in the case of actual knowledge of the existence of these activities than in the case of his/her preoccupation with them. When separate measures of corruption and fraud are employed simultaneously, all of the coefficients show a negative relationship, however, only two achieve the conventional levels of statistical significance. When the concern and awareness variables are included alternatively (results not shown), the concern for governmental wrongdoings is also statistically significant in addition to

the two variables that show statistical significance in Model 4, the knowledge of fraud in general and the concern for corruption in general. Figure 2 displays the effects of substantive changes in the corruption and fraud variables on the probability of trust in the government (conversion of the logit coefficients to probabilities not shown in tabular format).

(Table 2 and Figure 2 about here)

The other individual-level variables either performed as expected according the literature or failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. As would be expected, individuals with better perceptions of the nation's future economic situation have a greater probability of trusting in government. The magnitude is high and positive for both of these variables across all models; this is indicative of a robust relationship.

Ideology has a significant and positive effect on people's propensity to trust in government—meaning that those more right-wing individuals tend to trust more than citizens who consider themselves leftists or centrists. Political interest is not significant, indicating that it does not really matter whether or not citizens discuss politics among friends. It does not affect their tendency to trust in government; they are going to trust it or not regardless of whether they verbalize their thoughts on politics. The age variable reveals that, although the magnitude much smaller than the life and economic evaluation variables across all models, as expected, the older you become the more trusting you tend to be in the government. No other socio-demographic variable achieves statistical significance.

### **Comparing the Effect of Corruption on Political Trust across Political Institutions**

Table 3 shows the results of a single specification of the base model, one model estimation for each of the remaining political institutions: the national parliament, political

parties, and the police. These findings show that the negative relationship between fear for and knowledge of corrupt and fraudulent activity in or against the government does not apply when it comes to other political institutions. First of all, neither of the corruption indexes achieves statistical significance regardless of the institutions (results not shown in Table 3). Therefore, we opted to show results for the equivalent to Model 4 in Table 1 for the national government. Using the individual corruption and fraud variables simultaneously, we can see that only in the case of the national parliament and the justice system do we find any effects on the corruption/trust relationship. Worrying about corruption in general has a negative effect on the tendency to trust in the justice system, while in the case of the national parliament, worrying about fraud in general actually has a positive effect on trust in the national parliament.

(Table 3 about here)

Sociotropic evaluations have a similar effect on the tendency to trust for all four institutions. The effect is positive and the magnitude is relatively high, as in the case of the national government. The same is true for the effect of life satisfaction, except when we are talking about trust in political parties. Being generally happy about your life has no bearing on trust in political parties. Interesting to point out, is that, differently from the case of the national government, ideology is not important for determining trust in the four institutions of Table 3. So it does not matter when you think of yourself as being on the left, center, or right. Political interest produces conflicting effects in the case of the justice system and political parties, a negative effect in the case of the justice system and a positive effect in the case of parties. Age is also significant and positive, but only in the case of the national parliament. Finally, of all political institutions, including the national government, gender is only significant in the case of the justice system; men tend to trust more than women.

## **Conclusion**

We began the paper by the puzzle that people, even knowing about the reported cases of political corruption, do not seem to be blaming the institutions. There appeared to be no connection between political corruption and citizens' attitudes towards those political institutions involved. So we questioned: what explains the apparent public's lack of response? After the more careful look at data on the attitudes towards several political institutions, we are able to say that those results were only apparent.

The results of the empirical analysis strongly suggest the evidence to support the corruption/trust hypothesis. The awareness of corrupt and fraudulent activities in the government is related with lower levels of citizens' propensity to trust in government. The case of actual knowledge of the existence of these activities has even a greater effect than just the preoccupation with them.

Regarding the other institutions that we analyzed, the findings suggested that the negative relationship between fear for and knowledge of corrupt and fraudulent activity in or against the government does not apply. Only in the case of the national parliament and the justice system do we find any effects on the corruption/trust relationship. Worrying about corruption in general has a negative effect on the tendency to trust in the justice system, while in the case of the national parliament, worrying about fraud in general actually has a positive effect on trust in the national parliament.

This study suggests fruitful avenues for future research. For instance, our findings suggest that it would be valuable to further detail the differences in citizen attitudes towards the different political institutions. A productive next step also might identify whether the relations observed here are influenced by people's status as supporters or opponents of those in power.

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## Appendix A. Variable Question Wording and Coding

**Trust in [Institution].** “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” Tend to trust (1), tend not trust (0).

**Awareness of Corruption/Fraud.** “Have you ever read, heard, or seen anything about...?”

- a) **Awareness Fraud**— “fraud in our country”. Mentioned (1), not mentioned (0);
- b) **Awareness Tax Evasion** —“tax evasion in our country”. Mentioned (1), not mentioned (0).

**Concern about Corruption/Fraud.** “From the following list of problems, which worry you most?”

- a) **Concern Fraud**— “defrauding the State (tax evasion, VAT fraud, etc.)”. Mentioned (1), not mentioned (0);
- b) **Concern Governmental Wrongdoings**— “wrongdoings in national and local government institutions”. Mentioned (1), not mentioned (0);
- c) **Concern Corruption**—“corruption”. Mentioned (1), not mentioned (0).

**Corruption/Fraud Awareness Index.** Based on the *Awareness of Corruption* questions, this variable is the sum of the corruption factors that the respondent is aware of. Both fraud and tax evasion (2), either fraud or tax evasion (1), neither (0).

**Corruption/Fraud Concern Index.** Based on the *Concern about Corruption* questions, this variable is the sum of the corruption factors that the respondent worry about. All three factors (3), two of the three factors (2), one of the three factors (1), none (0).

**Interest in Politics.** “When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?” Frequently (3), occasionally (2), never (1).

**Left-Right Self-Placement.** In political matters, people talk of the left and the right? How would you place yourself on this scale? Recoded scale has three categories: left (1), center (2), right (3).

**Egocentric Economic Evaluations.** “What are your expectations for the year to come, will 2004 be better, worse or the same when it comes to the financial situation of your household?” Better (3), same (2), worse (1).

**Sociotropic Economic Evaluations.** “What are your expectations for the year to come, will 2004 be better, worse or the same when it comes to the economic situation in our country?” better (3), same (2), worse (1).

**Life Satisfaction.** “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” Very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied (2), not at all satisfied (1).

**Age.** Respondent’s age.

**Sex.** male (1), female (0).

**Employment Status.** Respondent’s current occupation. Employed (1), unemployed (0).

**Marital Status.** Respondent’s marital status. Married (1), not married (0).



**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std.Dev.</b>
Trust in Government	0	1	.435	.496
Trust in Parliament	0	1	.513	.500
Trust in Political Parties	0	1	.184	.387
Trust in Police	0	1	.636	.481
Trust in the Justice System	0	1	.504	.500
Corr/Fraud Awareness Index	0	2	1.777	.531
Corr/Fraud Concern Index	0	3	1.027	.919
Awareness Fraud	0	1	.910	.286
Awareness Tax Evasion	0	1	.866	.341
Concern Fraud	0	1	.258	.438
Concern Gov. Wrongdoings	0	1	.238	.426
Concern Corruption	0	1	.531	.499
Interest in Politics	1	3	1.603	.617
Left-Right Self-Placement	1	3	1.886	.751
Egocentric Econ. Evaluations	1	3	1.918	.664
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluations	1	3	1.607	.751
Life Satisfaction	1	4	2.543	.740
Age	0	1	44.697	18.893
Gender	0	1	.461	.499
Employment Status	0	1	.505	.500
Marital Status	0	1	.581	.494

**TABLE 2. Logit Results for Corruption and Political Trust in Government, 2003**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Constant	-3.056**** (.664)	-3.107**** (.658)	-3.565**** (.611)	-2.888**** (.671)
Corruption/Fraud Awareness Index (high=greater awareness)	-.356** (.174)	-.442*** (.170)		
Corruption/Fraud Concern Index (high=greater concern)	-.247*** (.098)		-.272*** (.095)	
Awareness Fraud (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)				-.822*** (.351)
Awareness Tax Evasion (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)				-.011 (.284)
Concern Fraud (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)				-.118 (.196)
Concern Gov. Wrongdoings (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)				-.303 <sup>a</sup> (.205)
Concern Corruption (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)				-.172* (.151)
Interest in Politics (high=greater)	-.056 (.147)	-.107 (.145)	-.098 (.144)	-.054 (.148)
Left-Right (high=Right)	.427**** (.112)	.411**** (.111)	.434**** (.110)	.435**** (.112)
Egocentric Econ. Evaluations (high=better)	.036 (.165)	-.006 (.164)	.027 (.164)	.028 (.166)
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluations (high=better)	.651**** (.136)	.667**** (.135)	.640**** (.135)	.649**** (.137)
Life Satisfaction (high=greater)	.477**** (.125)	.484**** (.124)	.479**** (.123)	.472**** (.125)
Age (high=older)	.013** (.006)	.014** (.005)	.012** (.005)	(.013)** (.006)
Gender (1=male; 0= female)	.224 (.175)	.203 (.174)	.240 (.171)	.225 (.175)
Employment Status (1=employed; 0=not employed)	-.145 (.183)	-.107 (.181)	-.116 (.181)	-.135 (.184)
Marital Status (1=married; 0=not married)	-.095 (.183)	-.068 (.183)	-.144 (.181)	-.135 (.184)
N	684	684	695	684
-2 Log Likelihood	-415.879	-419.125	-425.516	-414.360

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*: p<.1; \*\*: p<.05; \*\*\*: p<.01; p<.001, two-tailed tests of statistical significance.


<sup>a</sup> Significant at p<.01 when, of the five individual corruption and fraud variables, only the concern for corruption variables are included in the model.

**TABLE 3. Logit Results for Corruption and Political Trust Across Political Institutions, 2003**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Model 1 Parliament</b>	<b>Model 2 Justice</b>	<b>Model 3 Parties</b>	<b>Model 4 Police</b>
Constant	-2.220*** (.649)	-.669 (.649)	-2.414*** (.773)	-1.255** (.639)
Awareness Fraud (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)	.010 (.342)	-.394 (.360)	.171 (.429)	.002 (.352)
Awareness Tax Evasion (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)	-.477 (.291)	.106 (.284)	-.585* (.328)	-.156 (.289)
Concern Fraud (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)	.390** (.190)	.187 (.189)	.268 (.226)	-.147 (.188)
Concern Gov. Wrongdoings (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)	-.143 (.195)	.141 (.192)	-.006 (.236)	-.211 (.189)
Concern Corruption (1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned)	-.008 (.168)	-.452*** (.168)	-.290 (.205)	.137 (.166)
Interest in Politics (high=greater)	-.083 (.143)	-.355** (.143)	.406** (.172)	-.160 (.141)
Left-Right (high=Right)	.253 (.025)	.097 (.108)	.043 (.133)	.255** (.108)
Egocentric Econ. Evaluations (high=better)	.106 (.156)	.136 (.154)	-.111 (.197)	.099 (.151)
Sociotropic Econ. Evaluations (high=better)	.542**** (.133)	.398*** (.130)	.513*** (.160)	.337** (.132)
Life Satisfaction (high=greater)	.285** (.119)	.253** (.118)	-.021 (.147)	.330*** (.116)
Age (high=older)	.013** (.005)	.001 (.005)	.004 (.007)	.006 (.005)
Gender (1=male; 0=female)	.159 (.170)	.413** (.169)	-.152 (.208)	.091 (.167)
Employment Status (1=employed; 0=not employed)	-.176 (.178)	-.216 (.178)	-.093 (.215)	-.233 (.177)
Marital Status (1=married; 0= not married)	-.241 (.180)	-.272 (.180)	-.102 (.219)	-.101 (.178)
N	670	670	693	691
-2 Log Likelihood	-431.416	-435.839	-320.856	-443.436

*Notes:* Standard errors in parentheses. All four models maintain statistically significant results with similar magnitudes in the same direction for all control variables when the corruption indexes are introduced together or separately; however, these indexes are never statistically significant. \*: p<.1; \*\*: p<.05; \*\*\*: p<.01; p<.001, two-tailed tests of statistical significance.

**Figure 1**      **Average Political Trust, 1993-2003**



**Figure2**      **Probability of Trust in Government and Corruption and Fraud**

